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LABOR RELATIONS IN PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS:
SHOULD LAY TEACHERS BE DENIED
PROTECTION OF THE GENERAL
LAWS?
In the 1979 case of NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago the
United States Supreme Court held that religious organizations
were not "employers" as that term is used in the National Labor
Relations Act. The effect of that holding was to deprive lay paro-
chial school teachers of statutory protection of their right to en-
gage in collective bargaining. This Comment urges congressional
redefinition of the term "employer" and examines the constitu-
tional questions that would arise should the NLRB be given stat-
utory authority to assert jurisdiction over parochial schools.
INTRODUCTION
Nonpublic schools save taxpayers a substantial amount of
money by relieving the financial burden on public schools.1 But
as the cost of education rises nonpublic schools in general, and
church-operated schools in particular, are less able to operate in-
dependently.2 Lay parochial school teachers3 have borne a share
of their employers' financial plight in the form of salaries substan-
tially lower than those of their public school counterparts.4 In the
1. Over 4.2 million students were enrolled in nonpublic schools during the
1976-77 school year. NATIONAL CATHOLIC EDUCATIONAL AsSOCIATION, A STATISTICAL
REPORT ON U.S. CATHOLIC ScHOOLS 1978-79 at 5 (1979). The average per pupil ex-
penditure in public elementary and secondary schools in the 1976-77 school year
was $1,816. WORLD ALANAC 184 (Hammond ed. 1979). Thus, the taxpayers' sav-
ings are substantial. The savingg are especially significant in larger urban areas
where public schools are finding it increasingly difficult to make ends meet. See,
e.g., Plan OK'd to Save Chicago Schools, L.A. Times, Jan. 6, 1980, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
2. See generally NATIONAL CATHOLIC EDUCATIONAL ASSOCIATION, A STATISTI-
CAL REPORT ON U.S. CATHOLIC Scxoois 1978-79 (1979).
3. Parochial school teachers are either religious (nuns, brothers, priests) or
lay (non-religious). This Comment is concerned only with employment relations
between church-operated elementary and secondary schools and their lay teach-
ers. When used in the text, unless otherwise indicated, "parochial school teach-
ers" refers only to the lay teachers in parochial schools.
4. Nationwide parochial school salary statistics are not available, but a corn-
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early 1970's parochial school teachers began organizing in order to
bargain collectively with their employers.5 The teachers elected
representatives who were certified by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board6 (NLRB) as the teachers' exclusive bargaining
agents.7 But in 1979, the United States Supreme Court, in NLRB
v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,8 held that the National Labor Rela-
tions Act9 (NLRA) does not apply to church-operated schools. By
so doing, the Supreme Court deprived parochial school teachers
of statutory protection of their associational right to organize and
bargain collectively.10
This Comment will examine the history of the NLRA, focusing
on the Supreme Court's construction of the Act in Catholic
Bishop. The Comment will discuss the constitutional questions
raised by the application of the NLRA to parochial schools. Fi-
nally, the Comment will suggest remedial legislation to protect
the right of parochial school teachers to organize and bargain col-
lectively. Such legislation is necessary to ensure that parochial
school teachers are fairly treated in the job market.
While Chicago and Fort Wayne-South Bend parochial school
teachers were trying to get their employers to the negotiating ta-
ble," their public school counterparts were making significant
gains through collective bargaining.12 The public school teachers
obtained higher salaries, as well as new or improved insurance
benefits and better sick leave provisions.13 Collective bargaining
by public school teachers in other areas led, in some cases, to ad-
ditional compensation for an above normal workload, and for
teacher participation in extracurricular activities.14 In addition to
parison of San Diego public school teachers' salaries with those of San Diego
Catholic school teachers illustrates the disparity. The lowest salary paid by the
San Diego Unified School District in 1979-80 was $11,753. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT, TEACHER'S SALARY SCHEDuLE-1979-80 at 1 (1979). The average
salary paid to Catholic school teachers in schools within the San Diego city limits
was $8,018. DIOCESE OF SAN DIEGO, AVERAGE SALARY SCHEDULES FOR SCHOOLS:
1978-79 AND 1977-78 COMPAISON (on file with the San Diego Law Review.)
5. See text accompanying notes 36-44 infra.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1976).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976). Representatives are elected by an appropriate bar-
gaining unit as determined under 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1976).
8. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1976).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
11. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, 224 N.L.R.B. 1226 (1976). See text ac-
companying notes 32-36 infra.
12. Graham, Means to an End: 'Collective Bargaining and Teacher Benefits,
VEwponrs, Nov. 1979, at 7.
13. Id. at 16-17.
14. C. PERRY & W. WILDMAN, THE IMPACT OF NEGOTIATIONS IN PUBLIC EDUCA-
TION 201 (1970). In some cases where extra compensation was not awarded, teach.
ers did succeed in distributing the extra work equally among the staff. Id.
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the pecuniary benefits, a recent Rand Corporatioia study reports
many positive consequences of collective bargaining between
public schools and teachers.' 5 The Rand study found that in
many cases the greater teacher autonomy resulting from gains
made in collective bargaining actually led to better relations be-
tween teachers and administrators.16 Public school teachers are
able to bargain collectively because of state laws that govern the
relations between the state and its employees.17 These state laws
do not cover the employment relations in parochial schools. Paro-
chial school teachers must, therefore, look to the NLRA for pro-
tection of their right to organize and bargain collectively.
THE NLRA AND PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS
In 1935, Congress enacted the NLRA (Wagner Act) in order to
eliminate obstructions to commerce by encouraging* collective
bargaining and protecting employees' rights to freedom of associ-
ation.18 Congress recognized that unequal bargaining power be-
tween individual employees and organized employers resulted in
depressed wages and poor working conditions, which in turn led
to strikes.19 In passing the Wagner Act, Congress legislated to the
full extent of its commerce clause power.20 Congress vested the
NLRB with "the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally per-
missible under the Commerce Clause."2' To facilitate its expan-
sive coverage, the Wagner Act defined "employer" in broad terms,
including in the definition any "person" acting in the interests of
an employer, but excluding certain governmental entities.22
15. Teachers' Stronger Voice in School Management, USA TODAY, Oct. 1979, at
9. The Rand study found that while collective bargaining did not give teachers
control of the schools, it did give teachers more imput into school operations, as
well as input into teacher evaluation and promotion. Id.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., CAL. GovT. CODE §§ 3540-3549.3 (West Supp. 1967-1979).
18. National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act) ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449
(1935).
19. Id. See also A. GOLDmA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONs LAw 71-73 (1976).
20. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
21. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963). See also NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
22. The Wagner Act defined "employer" as:
any person acting in the interest of an employer ... but shall not include
the United States, or any state, or political subdivision thereof, or any per-
son subject to the National Railway Labor Act,. .. or any labor organiza-
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In 1947, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act23 which amended
the Wagner Act and changed the definition of "employer." The
original House bill would have changed the definition of "em-
ployer" to exclude corporations and foundations operating exclu-
sively for educational or religious purposes.24 However, the final
version limited the exclusion to nonprofit hospitals.25
The next major change in the NLRA came in 1974.26 Congress
again changed the definition of "employer," this time removing
the nonprofit hospital exemption.27 The change came in response
to recognition strikes by hospital employees asserting their rights
to bargain collectively.28 Faced with the large number of non-
profit hospital employees and the hospitals' substantial impact on
commerce, Congress could no longer justify denial of NLRA pro-
tection to these employees. 29 Even so, NLRA protection is not
guaranteed to nonprofit hospitals since the NLRB will exercise
jurisdiction over nonprofit organizations only if the Board's dis-
cretionary jurisdictional criteria are met.30 The NLRB determined
that the schools operated by the Catholic Bishop of Chicago, and
the Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend met its jurisdictional cri-
teria.31
When Congress passed the Wagner Act in 1935 there was no
need for the NLRB to assert jurisdiction over parochial schools.
In 1935, eighty-eight percent of the teachers in parochial schools
tion (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the
capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act), ch. 372, § 2(2), 49 Stat. 449
(1935). "Person" is defined as "one or more individuals, partnerships, associations,
corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers."
Wagner Act ch. 372, § 2(1), 49 Stat, 449 (1935).
23. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat.
136 (1947).
24. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1935), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 161 (1974).
25. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 101, § 2, 61
Stat. 136 (1947)., The House conference report indicates that the general religious,
nonprofit organization exemption was eliminated as unnecessary because such or-
ganizations were rarely seen as affecting commerce. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MAN-
AGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 536 (1974).
26. Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395.
27. Id. § 1.
28. S. REP. No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG,
& AD. NEWS 3946, 3948.
29. Id.
30. 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1979). The NLRB has never exercised Its jurisdiction to
its fullest extent because of time and budget constraints. B. TAYLOR & F. WrrNEY,
LABOR RELATIONS LAw 243-46 (3d ed. 1979). The authority of the NLRB to decline
jurisdiction is found in 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1976).
31. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 220 N.LR.B. 359 (1975); Diocese of Fort
Wayne-South Bend, 224 N.L.R.B. 1226 (1976).
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were nuns, brothers, or priests. 32 The NLRB did, however, assert
jurisdiction over a nonprofit religious publishing company,33 and
in 1970 the Board stated that it would no longer refuse to assert
jurisdiction over nonprofit educational institutions. 34 In recent
years religious organizations have come to rely heavily on lay
teachers to staff their elementary and secondary schools.3 5 In re-
sponse to this change in parochial school faculty composition, the
NLRB began to assert jurisdiction over parochial schools meeting
its discretionary jurisdictional criteria.36 Faced with NLRB inter-
ference, parochial schools asserted first amendment challenges to
NLRB jurisdiction.37 The NLRB rejected the constitutional chal-
lenges, but decided to assert jurisdiction only over church-oper-
ated schools that were merely "religiously associated" and not
over "completely religious" schools.3 8
Applying its discretionary criteria, the NLRB asserted jurisdic-
tion over secondary schools run by the Catholic Bishop of Chi-
cago,3 9 and the Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend.40 Lay
teachers employed in both school systems sought to elect repre-
32. FRANcIscAN ALMANAC 203 (1937).
33. Christian Bd. of Publications, 13 N.L.R.B. 534 (1939).
34. Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970) (the Board stated that it would no
longer refuse to assert jurisdiction over nonprofit educational institutions). In
NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980), the Supreme Court overruled Cornell,
at least in so far as Cornell afforded NLRA protection to professors in private uni-
versities. The Court held that Yeshiva University professors were "managerial
employees" and thus not "employees" entitled to NLRA protection. Id. at 686-90.
The decision was based on findings that at Yeshiva, the faculty decides what
courses will be offered, when classes will be scheduled, the teaching methods to
be employed, grading policies, and matriculation standards. Id. at 686. Whatever
the ramifications at the university level, Yeshiva does not prevent application of
the NLRA to parochial elementary and secondary schools. Elementary and high
school teachers do not have the same control that Yeshiva University professors
have. Decisions as to curriculum, length of the school day, and grading standards
are made initially by the state, leaving a church-operated school free to offer addi-
tional courses, extend the school day, and impose stricter academic standards.
Yeshiva will likely result in a lobbying effort to persuade Congress to amend the
NLRA definition of "employee" to include private university professors.
35. NATIONAL CATHOLIC EDUCATIONAL ASSOCIATION, A STATISTICAL REPORT ON
U.S. CATHOLIC SCHoOLs 1978-79, at 19 (1979). Table 20 shows that lay teachers rep-
resented 69.3% of Catholic elementary and secondary school faculty in 1978-79. In
1968-69 lay teachers accounted for only 43.3% of the total faculty. Id.
36. Henry M. Hald High School Ass'n, 213 N.L.R.B. 415 (1974).
37. Id.
38. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216 N.LLB. 249 (1975); Archdi-
ocese of Philadelphia, 227 N.L.R.B. 1178 (1977). See also note 30 supra.
39. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 220 N.L.R.B. 359 (1975).
40. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, 224 N.L.R.B. 1226 (1976).
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sentatives for the purpose of collective bargaining with their em-
ployers. The NLRB ordered the representative elections. 41 The
lay teachers elected union representatives which the NLRB certi-
fied as the exclusive bargaining agents of the lay faculty mem-
bers.42 When the employer-schools refused to bargain, the unions
filed unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB.43 Rejecting
first amendment challenges to its jurisdiction, the NLRB ordered
the schools to bargain with the unions.44 Still the schools refused
to bargain and sought review in the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. 45
The Seventh Circuit's opinion is significant in three respects.
First, the court found that religious organizations are "employers"
within the meaning of the NLRA.46 Second, the court rejected the
NLRB's "completely religious-merely religiously associated"
standard as an unworkable guide in exercising Board discretion.47
Third, the circuit court held unconstitutional the application of
the NLRA to parochial schools, because its application resulted in
excessive governmental entanglement with religion.48
The NLRB then sought review in the United States Supreme
Court. In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop,49 the Supreme Court did not
reach the constitutional issues considered by the Seventh Circuit.
Rather, the Supreme Court limited its holding to a construction of
the NLRA. Finding "no clear expression of an affirmative inten-
tion of Congress"5 0 that parochial school teachers be protected by
the NLRA, the Court declined to construe the NLRA as granting
Board jurisdiction over teachers in church-operated schools.51
The Court would apparently require "religious organizations" or
"church-operated schools" to be expressed in the NLRA's defini-
tion of "employer" before affording the Act's protection to paro-
chial school teachers.
The "affirmative intention" language quoted and relied upon by
41. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 220 N.L.R.B. 359 (1975).
42. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 224 N.L.R.B. 1221 (1976); Diocese of Fort
Wayne-South Bend, 224 N.L.R.B. 1226 (1976).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977). (The
Catholic Bishop and Fort Wayne-South Bend cases were consolidated for review.)
46. Id. at 1115. (Relying on NLRB v. Wentworth, 515 F.2d 550 (1st Cir. 1975).
47. Catholic Bishop v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1118 (7th Cir. 1977). The court rec-
ognized that rejection of this standard would result in the NLRB asserting juris-
diction over all religious schools. For that reason the court examined the first
amendment problems. Id. at 1123.
48. See text accompanying notes 95-100 infra.
49. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
50. Id. at 504.
51. Id.
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the Catholic Bishop majority originally appeared in Benz v. Com-
pania Naviera Hildalgo ,52 and later in McCulloch v. Sociedad Na-
cional.5 3 In the latter two cases the Court refused to apply the
NLRA to foreign seamen working aboard foreign flag vessels in
United States ports. Those decisions rested upon legislative his-
tory which indicated that the NLRA's purpose was to protect
American, not foreign, workers.5 4 Neither Benz nor McCulloch is
on point because in Catholic Bishop the NLRB asserted jurisdic-
tion to protect American teachers. The Court advances no theory
to explain why American teachers should be treated the same as
foreign seamen whose employment relations are governed by the
laws of the vessel's flag state.5 5
However, the employment relationship in Catholic Bishop is
analogous to the relationship between a press organization and
its employees. In Associated Press v. NLRB,56 the Supreme Court
did not require Congress "affirmative intent" before applying the
NLRA to an organization that, like the Catholic Bishop of Chi-
cago, is protected by the first amendment.5 7 The Court found that
the Associated Press was an "employer" under the NLRA be-
cause of that organization's numerous contacts with interstate
commerce.5 8 The Court then rejected the Associated Press claims
of first amendment infringement. The Court held that the first
amendment does not grant an immunity from the general laws to
52. 353 U.S. 138 (1957). "For us to run interference.in such a delicate field of
international relations there must be present the affirmative intention of Con-
gress clearly expressed." Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
53. 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
54. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hildalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 144 (1957); McCulloch v.
Sociedad Nacional, 372 U.S. 10, 20 (1963).
55. In Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887), the Supreme Court stated:
From experience... it was found long ago that it would be beneficial to
commerce if the local government would abstain from interfering with'the
internal discipline of the ship, and the general regulation of the rights and
duties of the officers and crew towards the vessel or among themselves.
And so by comity it came to be generally understood among civilized na-
tions that all matters of discipline and all things done on board which af-
fected only the vessel or those belonging to her, and did not involve the
peace or dignity of the country, or the tranquility of the port, should be
left by the local government to be dealt with by the authorities of the na-
tion to which the vessel belonged as the laws of that nation or the inter-
ests of its commerce should require.
Id. at 12.
56. 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
57. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press." U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
58. 301 U.S. 103, 126-27 (1937).
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the press.59 In Catholic Bishop the NLRB relied heavily on Asso-
ciated Press to support the constitutionality of its jurisdiction.
The Catholic Bishop majority, distinguished Associated Press
from Catholic Bishop on constitutional grounds, 60 an intriguifig
sleight of hand since Catholic Bishop rested solely on statutory
construction.61 In Associated Press the Court did not even sug-
gest the requirement of an affirmative congressional intent to ap-
ply the NLRA. Associated Press rested on a finding that affording
NLRA protection to press employees did not infringe first amend-
ment press freedoms. Catholic Bishop, however, addressed the
first amendment issues only in dicta. The Catholic Bishop major-
ity distinguished the holding in Associated Press from dicta in
Catholic Bishop.
The Catholic Bishop majority's construction of the NLRA fol-
lows Chief Justice Marshall's admonition, in The Charming
Betsy,6 2 that an act of Congress should not be construed to vio-
late the Constitution if any other construction is possible.63 Chief
Justice Marshall's test was later refined in Crowell v. Benson,64 in
which the Supreme Court stated that, if a question arises as to
the constitutionality of a statute, the "Court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which
the [constitutional] question may be avoided."65 Justice Bren-
nan, dissenting in Catholic Bishop, concludes that a construction
of the NLRA that judicially creates an additional exception to the
Act's definition of "employer" is not "fairly possible."66 Brennan's
is the better construction given the wide jurisdictional discretion
formerly accorded the NLRB.67 Under Justice Brennan's view the
59. "The business of the Associated Press is not immune from regulation be-
cause it is an agency of the press. The publisher of a newspaper has no special
immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special privilege to in-
vade the rights and liberties of others." Id. at 132-33. Cf. Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding statutory ban on polygamy against a free ex-
ercise challenge).
60. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979).
61. The majority's language limiting its decision is unmistakably clear 'Thus
if we were to conclude that the Act granted the challenged jurisdiction we would
be required to decide whether that was constitutionally permissible under the Re-
ligion Clauses of the First Amendment." Id. at 498. "[I]n the absence of a clear
expression of Congress' intent... we decline to construe the Act in a manner
that could in turn call upon the Court to resolve difficult and sensitive questions
arising out of... the . . . Religion Clauses." Id. at 507.
62. Murray v. The Charming Betsey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
63. Id. at 118.
64. 235 U.S. 22 (1932).
65. Id. at 62 (emphasis added). See also Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740
(1961) (holding it was possible to construe the Railway Labor Act to deny unions
the right to use union dues for political causes opposed by union members).
66. NLRB v. Cathlic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 510 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224 (1963). See generally R.
1100
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Court would have had to reach the constitutional issues using the
analytical framework developed in prior religion clause cases.68
The Catholic Bishop holding places the burden of protecting
the associational rights of parochial school teachers on Congress.
Congress should change the NLRA definition of "employer" to in-
clude church-operated schools. In considering such amending
legislation, Congress must determine whether NLRB jurisdiction
over parochial schools is violative of the first amendment religion
clauses. The remainder of this Comment examines the constitu-
tional issues arising from application of the NLRA to church-oper-
ated schools.
CONSTrTUTIONALrrY OF NLRB JURISDICTON OVER CHURCH-
OPERATED SCHOOLS
The first amendment's religion clauses are stated in absolute
terms: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... -69 The
object may have been complete and permanent separation be-
tween church and state,70 but the Supreme Court has refused to
place religious belief above the law of the land.71 The first amend-
ment does not secure religious conduct which encroaches upon
the freedoms of others or threatens a community's security.72
Schools figure prominently in the development of law under the
religion clauses. The constitutionality of various forms of state
aid to parochial schools has been challenged in the courts.73 Pa-
GonMAN, BASIC TEXT, LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 21-
39 (1976).
68. See generally L. TRBE, AMERCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 812-885 (1978).
69. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. Originally a restraint only on the federal govern-
ment, see Barton v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), both religion
clauses have been made applicable to the states by operation of the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
(free exercise clause); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1. (1947) (establishment
clause).
70. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1947).
71. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878) (upholding a statutory
ban against polygamy against a free-exercise challenge). See also Henkin, Infalli-
bility Under the Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLM. L. REV. 1022, 1043-44
(1978).
72. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947). See also Zorach v. Clay-
son, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952). See generally Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestab-
lishment and Doctrinal Development, (pt. 1), 80 HARV. L REV. 1381 (1967).
73. See Young, Constitutional Validity of State Aid to Pupils in Church-Re-
lated Schools-Internal Tension Between the Establishment and Free Exercise
1101
rochial school aid may not take the form of money payments to
lay teachers,74 to the schools,7 5 or to parents of parochial school
pupils.7 6 However, aid directed to parochial school students in
the form of book loans and services has been allowed.7 7 Of
course, any form of aid that allows parochial schools to perform
secular functions frees church funds which can then be spent for
religious purposes. 7 8 But as Chief Justice Burger recently stated
"total separation is not possible"79 and constitutionality does not
depend upon the reality of economic impact.80 Faced with situa-
tions where religious guarantees conflicted with other societal in-
terests the Supreme Court developed a three-pronged test for
determining constitutionality under the religion clauses. A stat-
ute must have a secular legislative purpose, and a primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and it must not foster
excessive governmental entanglement.81
Secular Legislative Purpose
To withstand constitutional analysis under the religion clauses,
a statute must at least be justifiable in secular terms.8 2 A statute
providing religious study release time from public schools cannot
be justified in secular terms and is therefore unconstitutional. 83
Similarly, a statute requiring prayer in public schools is unconsti-
tutional because it clearly has a religious purpose.8 4 The "secular
purpose" requirement is probably best viewed as a threshold test.
This test is rarely decisive because modern statutes are usually
Clauses, 38 OHIo ST. L.J. 783 (1977). See also L. PFEFFER, RELIGIous FREEDOM
(1977).
74. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
75. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Levitt v. Commit-
tee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
76. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756 (1973) (tuition reimbursement and parental tax credit).
77. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
(1968). The Supreme Court also allowed book loans to students in Cochran v.
Board of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930). However, the Cochran Court did not consider
first amendment questions.
78. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976). Wheeler v. Bar-
rera, 417 U.S. 402, 430-32 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also L. TRiBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 843 (1978).
79. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
80. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 658-
59 (1980).
81. Id. at 653. See generally L. TRBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrTUoNAL LAw 835-80
(1978).
82. See L. TRIE, AMERICAN CONsTrrmoNAL LAw 835 (1978).
83. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). See also Epperson v. Ar-
kansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (held unconstitutional an Arkansas statute prohibiting
teaching of evolution in state supported schools).
84. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962).
1102
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carefully drafted to reflect a secular purpose.8 5
The NLRA clearly states a secular legislative purpose. Even
when applied to parochial schools, the Act's purpose remains, "to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the
free flow of commerce."86
Primary Secular Effect
In addition to a "secular purpose," legislation must have "a pri-
mary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion"87 in order
for it to withstand a constitutional attack on first amendment
grounds. In Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,88 the
Supreme Court invalidated a statute that provided for "mainte-
nance and repair" grants to nonpublic schools. Virtually all of the
beneficiaries of the statute were Roman Catholic schools. The
statute, however, did not restrict the use of grant funds to the
maintenance of secular facilities. A Catholic school was thus able
to expend state funds for the maintenance of the school chapel or
other sectarian facilities. Absent restrictions on the uses for
which the state funds were expended, the statute's primary effect
was to advance religion because it directly subsidized the reli-
gious activities of sectarian schools.8 9
The statute struck down in Nyquist also provided for financial
assistance to the parents of nonpublic school students. Depend-
ing on family income, a parent could qualify for aid in the form of
a tuition reimbursement9 0 or a tax benefit.91 These provisions had
the primary effect of advancing religion because they encouraged
parents to send their children to parochial schools. 92
85. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). "[W]e
need touch only briefly on the requirement of a 'secular legislative purpose.' As
the recitation of legislative purposes appended to New York's law indicates, each
measure is adequately supported by legitimate, nonsectarian state interests." Id.
at 773. See also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). See generally L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONsTrruroNAL LAw 835-39 (1978).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
87. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
88. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
89. Id. at 774. The statute, N.Y. EDUC. LAw, art. 12, §§ 549-553 (Supp. 1972-1973),
allowed state funds to be used to pay the salaries of employees who maintain the
school chapel.
90. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780-89 (1973).
91. Id. at 789-94.
92. The statute, N.Y. EDUC. LAw, art. 12, §§ 549-553 (Supp. 1972-1973), was writ-
ten in terms of nonpublic schools. However, approximately 85% of the state's non-
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The primary effects of the NLRA are to encourage collective
bargaining and protect workers' rights to organize. 93 Legislation
amending the NLRA definition of employer to include church-op-
erated schools will extend statutory protection to parochial school
teachers' rights to organize. Opponents of such legislation may
contend that it inhibits religion because parochial schools, forced
by collective bargaining to pay higher salaries and provide better
benefits, will be less able to provide for the religious needs of stu-
dents. But economic impact is not determinative of a statute's
constitutionality,9 4 and the primary effect of including church-op-
erated schools in the NLRA's definition of employer is to protect
the rights of the teachers.
Government Entanglement with Religion
Even though a statute satisfies the "secular purpose" and "sec-
ular effect" requirements, the danger of excessive government en-
tanglement remains. There are two lines of cases that are
relevant to a discussion of the constitutionality of permitting
NLRB jurisdiction over parochial schools. The first line of cases
sets out generally the parameters of permissible government en-
tanglement with religion. The second line of cases deals specifi-
cally with the application of civil rights legislation to religious
organizations. These cases are especially helpful because the
fact-finding involved in the application of civil rights legislation to
religious organizations is analogous to the fact-finding necessary
for effective NLRB jurisdiction over parochial schools.
Excessive versus Permissible Government Entanglement
Entanglement occurs where policing is necessary to ensure a
statute's secular effect. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,95 the Supreme
Court held that a state may not use public funds to supplement
parochial school teachers' salaries. The statute involved con-
tained restrictions to ensure its secular effect.96 However, the re-
strictions themselves fostered excessive entanglement because
extensive policing would be required to ensure that the restric-
public schools were church-affiliated, and over 68% were Roman Catholic. 413 U.S.
at 768.
93. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
94. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 658-
59 (1980).
95. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
96. Under the statute, an eligible recipient was restricted to teaching only
courses taught in the public schools. Recipients could use only texts and materi-
als found in public schools and could not teach a course in religion. 403 U.S. 602,
613 (1971).
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tions were observed.97
Since total separation is impossible, permissive entanglement is
a matter of degree.9 8 In Walz v. Tax Commission,99 New York
taxpayers challenged a statute that provided a property tax ex-
emption to religious organizations. The Supreme Court upheld
the exemption because it created "only a minimal and remote in-
volvement between the church and state and far less than taxa-
tion of churches."100
Entanglement is most intrusive if civil courts attempt to resolve
conflicts of church policy.Ol A state court may not order rein-
statement of a bishop who has been defrocked by church authori-
ties. 102 But, the relationship between a church and its lay
employees is distinguishable from the relationship between a
church and its ministers. The former relationship is essentially
dependent on the job market for its existence, while the latter de-
pends solely upon the faith and calling of the individual. The ap-
plication of the NLRA to church-operated schools will result in
government entanglement with religion. The entanglement will
be in the form of NLRB supervision of representative elections
and NLRB inquiries into charges of unfair labor practices.
Whether that entanglement is excessive and, therefore, prohib-
ited, depends upon the permissible scope of factual inquiries
under the religion clauses.
While a civil court may not determine the truth of a religious
97. The Supreme Court found excessive entanglement where:
A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will
inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the
First Amendment otherwise respected. Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be
inspected once so as to determine the extent and intent of his or her per-
sonal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the
First Amendment. These prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and
enduring entanglements between state and church.
Id. at 619. See also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (upholding statutory pro-
visions of various neutral site services and objective testing and diagnostic serv-
ices, but disallowing field trip transportation and loans of instructional equipment
and materials to students). Cf. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976)
(upheld statute providing funds to private institutions of higher learning to be
used for secular purposes only); New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125
(1977) (audit necessary to ensure state funds were not used for secular purposes
constituted excessive entanglement).
98. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 676.
101. See I TRBE, Ai mi-CA CONSTrrtmONAL LAW 870-80 (1978).
102. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
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belief, the court may determine the sincerity of a professed be-
lief.' 03 In addition, circumstances may necessitate an inquiry into
how central a practice affected by a statute is to a religion. 04
These, along with the determination of whether or not a particu-
lar activity is religious, are precisely the inquiries which the
NLRB would have to make if church-operated schools were in-
cluded in the definition of "employer."
The Supreme Court long ago sanctioned factual inquiries in
property tax cases involving exemptions for religious organiza-
tions. 05 In Gibbons v. District of Columbia'06 the Court found
that certain church-owned land was used for the production of in-
come rather than for religious purposes. The applicable property
taxing statute provided an exemption to church-owned property
only if it were used for religious purposes. The Court accordingly
held that the income property was not exempt from taxation 07
Similarly, in a labor dispute a civil court would be competent to
decide whether the NLRB were correct in finding that a particular
labor practice was or was not religiously-based.
A determination of the sincerity of religious belief is now estab-
lished as proper judicial fact-finding.108 In United States v. Bal-
lard,109 respondents were convicted of using the mails to defraud.
The indictment charged that respondents knowingly asserted
false religious doctrines." 0 The trial court charged the jury to
consider the sincerity of respondent's belief and not the truth of
the religious doctrine."' The United States Supreme Court ap-
proved the trial court's decision to withhold the question of the
truth of the belief from the jury.112
The Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder113 held that a state
may not force parents, against their religious beliefs, to send their
children to school after the eighth grade. The opinion described
103. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
104. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235-36 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 406 (1963).
105. Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404 (1886).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 407.
108. See L. TRIBE, AmEcAN CONSTrrTONAL LAw 859-65 (1978).
109. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
110. Id. at 80.
111. Id. at 82.
112. Id. The Court remanded the case to the circuit court for consideration of
other issues. The dissent would have reinstated the trial court's decision. "On the
issue submitted to the jury in this case it properly rendered a verdict of guilty."
Id. at 92 (Stone, CJ., dissenting). See also Giannella, Religious Liberty, Non-
establishmen and Doctrinal Development (pt. 1), 80 HARv. L REV. 1381, 1417
(1967).
113. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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the principles of faith which led Amish parents to withdraw their
children from school.114 Because the Amish parents demon-
strated the sincerity of their beliefs, the Court held that the
state's interests in compulsory secondary education did not re-
quire attendence by Amish children." 5
In Catholic Bishop v. NLRB,116 the Seventh Circuit concluded
that application of the NLRA to parochial schools would result in
excessive government entanglement with religion."17 The circuit
court feared that in processing an unfair labor practice charge,
the NLRB would necessarily concern itself with whether a dis-
charge resulted from the cause stated by the employer or whether
the stated cause was merely a pretext to disguise a discharge in
retaliation against an employee's union activity."18 But such an
inquiry would not be unique to employment relations in parochial
schools. The NLRB must routinely look behind the stated cause
for dismissal to determine if the employer is acting in good
faith.119 A parochial school may discharge a teacher for cause
based on sincere religious belief. For example, a teacher in a
Catholic school who advocated the use of contraceptives to con-
trol world population would not be immune to disciplinary action
or termination by school officials. But if the NLRA applied to
church-operated schools, a parochial school could not use reli-
gious belief merely as a pretext for firing a teacher. Should the
NLRB find that a parochial school employer was not engaged in
the good faith practice of a religious belief in discharging a
teacher, it would order the teacher reinstated. Absent statutory
protection a parochial school teacher, fired for engaging in union
activity, is unable to vindicate his or her associational rights to
engage in union activity.
The cases involving judicial resolution of church-owned prop-
erty disputes also shed light on the constitutionality of NLRB in-
114. The Amish life style depended upon manual labor and did not require
great intellectual development. Respondents demonstrated at trial that they be-
lieved that they and their children would be subject to the censure of the church if
the children attended high school. Id. at 209.
115. Id. at 235.
116. 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1125.
119. It is the duty of the administrative law judge to inquire into the facts to
determine whether the respondent engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in
the complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 102.35 (1979).
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quiries into parochial school employment relations. Civil courts
may not resort to interpretation of ecclesiastical law to resolve
property disputes. 12 0 However, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that "neutral principles of law" applicable to all property
disputes are equally applicable to disputes involving church-
owned property.121 The "neutral principles" approach allows civil
courts to consider language in the deed, statutes governing the
holding of property by religious organizations, the charters of lo-
cal church corporations, and pertinent provisions of the church's
general constitution.122 The application of the "neutral princi-
ples" approach is not without difficulty. The United States
Supreme Court stated that civil courts must be careful to study
the various documents in purely secular terms.123
The principle which emerges from the above case is that judi-
cial determination of secular issues is permissible so long as the
secular issues are kept distinct from the religious issues. Analo-
gous to the fact-finding involved in applying the NLRA to paro-
chial schools is that done in regard to alleged civil rights
violations by religious organizations.
Religion and Civil Rights Legislation
Courts enforcing civil rights legislation against religious organi-
zations must determine whether or not the organization is en-
gaged in the good faith practice of a religious belief.124 Similarly,
an amendment to the NLRA, which includes church-operated
schools in the definition of "employer," would require the NLRB
to determine whether religious organizations were engaged in the
120. See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
121. Presbyterian Church v. Blue Hull Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449
(1969). On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court awarded the disputed property to
local churches rather than the general church because the deeds conveying the
property named the local churches as grantees. 225 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d 658 (1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1041 (1970). Cf. Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga. 30, 222 S.E.2d 322
(1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976) (the Georgia Supreme Court awarded title
to the general church where church doctrine provided that any conveyance of
property to a local church created an implied trust in favor of the general church).
122. Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at
Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367 (1970).
123. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 593, 604 (1979). The Court also noted the advan-
tages:
The primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach are that it is
completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to accommodate
all forms of religious organization and polity. The method relies exclu-
sively on objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law fa-
miliar to lawyers and judges. It thereby promises to free civil courts
completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity,
and practice.
Id. at 603.
124. See text accompanying notes 139-150 infra.
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good faith practice of religion. The case law regarding application
of civil rights legislation to religious organizations indicates that
such inquiries by the NLRB are constitutionally permissible.
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,125 codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, "prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforce-
ment of private contracts.' 26 In Runyon v. McCrary,127 the
Supreme Court considered the applicability of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to
private schools that refused admission to black children.128 The
Court held that the racial exclusion practiced by the schools
amounted to a classic violation of section 1981.129 At the outset
the Court carefully limited its holding to the practices of private
nonsectarian schools.1 30 Still, the Court faced the problem of first
amendment infringement. The Court recognized a first amend-
ment right of parents to send their children to schools that teach
that racial segregation is desirable. The Court refused, however,
to afford the same first amendment protection to the practice of
excluding racial minorities from such institutions.'13
Subsequent to Runyon the Fifth Circuit considered a section
1981 charge against a sectarian school in Brown v. Dade Christian
Schools, Inc.132 Dade Christian Schools refused admission to
black children. The school asserted that its racial policy was
based upon sincerely held religious beliefs and protected by the
free exercise clause.133 The circuit court found Dade Christian
Schools in violation of section 1981, but carefully limited its opin-
ion, reviewing only the trial court's determination of whether the
school's racial practices were actually founded upon religious be-
lief.134 The circuit court upheld the trial court's finding that the
school's racial policy was not an exercise of religion. 35 However,
the Dade Christian court indicated that a free exercise defense
125. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
126. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 172.
130. Id. at 167-68.
131. Id. at 176. See also Everson v. Board of Pub. Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31 (1947).
132. 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
133. Id. at 311.
134. Id. at 312.
135. We do not hold that a belief must be permanently recorded in written
form to be religious in nature. However, the absence of references to
school segregation in literature stating the church's beliefs,.. . is strong
evidence that school segregation is not the exercise of religion.... [T]he
trial judge concluded that, if belief in school segregation was religious in
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would be available to a sectarian school or church against a sec-
tion 1981 claim if the alleged discrimination were in fact based on
tenets of the religion.13 6
In McLure v. Salvation Army,137 the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals considered the applicability of title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to religious organizations.138 Congress passed title VII
to eliminate employment discrimination based upon race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.139 Mrs. McClure was a minister
who alleged that her employer, the Salvation Army, discriminated
against her because of her sex.140 The court first determined that
the Salvation Army, a religious organization, was an employer
subject to title VI.'4 Even so, the court held that title VII does
not cover the employment relationship between a church and its
minister. 4 2 The court did not determine title VII's applicability to
employment relations between a church and its lay employees.
The court did state, however, that only certain employment rela-
tionships are exempt and that religious organizations are not
completely free from title VI's discrimination prohibitions.143
The factual inquiries necessary to apply the NLRA to parochial
schools are similar to those approved in Dade Christian and Mc-
Clure. Although NLRA applications will result in entanglement,
the NLRB will not be called upon to resolve ecclesiastical dis-
putes. The NLRA empowers the NLRB to prevent any "person"
nature, neither the officers of the school nor the congregation of the
church were aware of it.
Id. at 312-13.
136. "Whether or not it is the exercise of religion or simply a policy of the insti-
tution not presenting a constitutional issue is a question of fact." Id. at 314. See
also General Council on Fin. of the United Methodist Church v. Superior Court of
San Diego, 439 U.S. 1369 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1979).
137. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972).
138. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1976).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1976).
140. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 555 (5th Cir. 1972).
141. Id. On Congressional intent that title VII cover religious organizations, the
court stated:
[T]he intention of Congress to allow such an organization to qualify as
an "employer" is shown by the fact that in subsequent provisions of Title
VII, limited and specific exemption from the Title's prohibitions were pro-
vided for them. The effect of these provisions is to cause a religious organ-
ization qualifying as such to be considered as an "employer," and to
eliminate only certain of their employment relations from the prohibitions
of Title VII.
Id. at 557 (emphasis added).
142. 'The relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its life-
blood.... Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be recognized as of
prime ecclesiastical concern." Id. at 558-59. See also Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
143. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972).
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from engaging in unfair labor practices. 144 The Board may certify
employees' bargaining representatives,145 and order an employer
to bargain with its employees. 146 The Board may not interfere
with the bargaining parties' freedom of qontract by compelling
agreement.147 In fact, if bargaining reaches a good faith impasse
an employer is free to impose its terms without fear of NLRB re-
prisal. 48 While protecting employees' associational rights, the
NLRA does not strip employers of their freedom of contract.149
Given these limitations on NLRB power, it is unrealistic to fear,
as some do, that a church will have to defer to teachers on policy
matters in its schools.150 In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.,151 the Supreme Court recognized that Congress did not
create the right of employees to organize.152 The right to organize
is a first amendment right-an associational right protected by
the first amendment. 53 Thus, when dealing with employment re-
lations in parochial schools, courts face two first amendment
rights in conflict: the right of a religious organization to be free
from excessive governmental entanglement versus the right of
employees to organize and bargain collectively. Since the entan-
glement created by applying the NLRA to parochial schools does
not exceed a limited fact-finding inquiry, the employees' associa-
tional rights should prevail. If the NLRB oversteps its authority
and encroaches upon ecclesiastical matters, the aggrieved reli-
144. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976). Unfair labor practices are specified at 29 U.S.C. § 158
(1976). "Person" is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1976).
145. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976).
146. H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 102 (1970); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5)
(1976) (makes refusal to bargain an unfair labor practice).
147. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937). "It must be
stressed that the duty to bargain collectively does not carry with it the duty to
reach an agreement. . ." S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935).
148. The NLRA does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
149. H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970).
150. See, e.g., Laylock, Catholic Schools and Teachers Unions, AMERICA, May 19,
1979, at 406.
151. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
152. Id. at 33.34. See also Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S.
261, 263 (1940).
153. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). '"Those guarantees include the
workers' right to organize freely for collective bargaining .... Necessarily correl-
ative was the right of the union, its members, and officials... to discuss with and
inform the employees .... These rights of assembly and discussion are protected
by the First Amendment." Id. at 533-34. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937). See generally D. FELLAN, THE CoNsTr= oNAL RIGHT OF Asso-
CIA ION 42-53 (1963).
1111
gious organization has recourse to judicial review. 5 4
CONCLUSION
The National Labor Relations Act was passed pursuant to a sec-
ular legislative purpose. It was intended to maintain the free flow
of commerce through collective bargaining. As applied to paro-
chial schools, the NLRA has a primarily secular effect. It does not
prevent the free exercise of religious beliefs, nor does it operate
to benefit or inhibit a particular religion. Application of the NLRA
results in only minimal governmental entanglement with religion.
If a court or administrative body finds that an employer school is
acting pursuant to religious beliefs, the inquiry halts. Should an
employer dispute the fact-finder's determination, it has recourse
to judicial review. If the Act is not applied to parochial schools,
employees of those schools are completely denied statutory pro-
tection of their right to organize and bargain collectively.
Teachers should not be denied protection of the general laws
because they choose, or are forced by market conditions, to work
for parochial schools. Congress should respond to Catholic
Bishop by amending the NLRA definition of "employer" to specif-
ically include religious organizations. Legislation amending the
NLRA should carefully state a secular purpose and ensure that
application of the amendment will neither advance nor inhibit re-
ligion. Congress should avoid "excessive entanglement"
problems by specifying the procedures for the NLRB to follow
when asserting jurisdiction over parochial schools. At the very
least such legislation will force the Supreme Court to address
squarely the "difficult and sensitive" constitutional questions.
GERALD SIMs
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154. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1976). See Grutka v. Barbour, 549 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 908 (1977).
